New Publication | Chips on the frontline: When silicon speaks the language of sovereignty
New Open Access Article on Semiconductors and the Language of Sovereignty
Published in Rivista di Digital Politics, the article examines how semiconductors moved from the vocabulary of trade to that of national security in US and EU political discourse between 2021 and 2025.
The article “Chips on the frontline: When silicon speaks the language of sovereignty”, by Armando Antonio Ferrara and Gerardo Ferrentino, has been published in Rivista di Digital Politics, issue 1-2/2026, within the Focus Digital Sovereignty.
Drawing on securitisation theory, the authors code forty-seven high-level speeches on five indicators of securitising language and assign each an intensity score, documenting a discursive shift that accompanied export controls, reshoring subsidies and investment-screening regimes.
Abstract
Semiconductors have moved, in the space of a few years, from the vocabulary of trade to that of national security. This article examines how that shift was accomplished in political discourse in the United States and the European Union between 2021 and 2025. Drawing on securitisation theory, we code forty-seven high-level speeches on five indicators of securitising language and assign each an intensity score. Two findings emerge. First, where semiconductors and security are discursively linked, securitisation is performed with consistently high intensity, and the most intense instances are concentrated at moments of institutional decision such as the adoption of the US CHIPS and Science Act and the EU Chips Act. Second, intensity varies systematically with institutional position: heads of state and security portfolios score above economic and research portfolios, and across the period the vocabulary spreads from the former to the latter, indicating institutional diffusion rather than rhetorical escalation. The analysis documents a discursive shift that accompanied the introduction of export controls, reshoring subsidies and investment-screening regimes, and considers what the securitisation of an industrial input implies for the governance of strategic technologies.
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